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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL
The sole issue on defendants' cross-appeal is whether
the trial court's application of the Product Liability Act's
statute of limitations in 1983 was appropriate. This is a different issue from that raised on plaintiff's appeal from the trial
court's 1986 order that the Product Liability Act's statute of
limitations is still the applicable statute of limitations regardless of this court's ruling that the Product Liability Act is
unconstitutional.
Defendants' cross-appeal states that the issue before
the court is:
(1) Did the trial court err when it
interpreted the Utah Product Liability Act
statute of repose, Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-15-3 (1953) , to be a statute of limitation which extended the two-year limitation
on wrongful death actions otherwise mandated
by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-28
(1953)?
Stating the issue in this fashion is misleading it suggests that
the trial court made its determination without considering the
Utah Products Liability Act statute of limitations as a statute
of repose•
The issue before the trial court in 1983 was which of
two potentially applicable statutes of liftiitations should apply
to the plaintiff's claim: the general two-year statute of limitation for wrongful death found in § 78-12428(2), Utah Code Ann,
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(Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977), or the special statute of limitation found
in the Utah Products Liability Act, § 78-15-1 et seq., Utah Code
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977) (hereinafter the "Act"). Accordingly,
the trial court properly found that the Product Liability statute
of limitation applied "specifically and exclusively to causes
of action of the type asserted in plaintiff's complaint and is
applicable to actions to recover damages for wrongful death which
are based on these causes of action."
The trial court's determination, as well as the manner
in which the trial court phrased the issue (which of two statutes
of limitation were applicable), reflected the explicit intent of
the legislature, as set forth in §§ 78-15-2 and 3 to create a
statute of limitations which applied to product liability actions.
As a result, during the period from 1977, when the Act was enacted, and December, 1985, when this Court held the Act unconstitutional, an injured plaintiff contemplating a product liability
action in Utah could reasonably look to that section of the Act
which specified the limitation periods for all product liability
actions as the applicable timeframe for commencing such an action.
The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's action was
timely and the Act's six-year limitation period applied was proper.
The trial court's determination was based on (1) the
fact that the statute of limitations set forth in the Product
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Liability Act Specifically included the type of action asserted
by the plaintiff;

and

(2) general principles of statutory con-

struction led to the conclusion that the Production Liability
statute or" limitation is the more specific, the

Legislature's

intent to provide limitation periods for all cases where the
gravamen of th% complaint involved a defective product,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rond^ M. Luther Raithaus died on July 2, 1979 from
injuries sustained when the Saab automobile she and her husband
Dr. Larry Raithaus were traveling in, burst into flames after
driving off the paved highway in Little Cottonwood Canyon, R.
3-4.

The Com^iaint in this action was filed on November 29,

1982, claiming damages for the death of Rohda M. Luther Raithaus,
plaintiff's wif e#

R . 6#

T he

Saab automobile in question was a

1976 model, R.^# bought by Dr. Raithaus ih February of 1977, R.
30, 64.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court was correct i:p concluding that the
statute of limitations contained in the tftah Product Liability
Act was applicable to this action.

Thi^ court's declaration

that the statut:e was unconstitutional canhot act to deprive the
plaintiff his d a y i n court. To the extent &n action filed within
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the then existing limitation period, the period becomes a vested
component of plaintiff's action which he cannot be constitutionally deprived of by a later declaration of unconstitutionality.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LIMITATION PERIODS SET FORTH IN THE
UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, SECTION 78-15-3,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 9A, 1977),
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The statute of limitations invoked by defendants, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-28(2), (1977), provides as follows:
Within two years: . . . (2) An action
to recover damages for the death of one caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another.
This section is one of the general limitation provisions which
are collected in Chapter 12 of Title 78 of the Utah Code.

The

first section of Chapter 12 provides an introduction to, and
governs, the limitation found at § 78-12-28(2).

It states:

Civil actions can be commenced only
within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action shall have occurred,
except where in special cases a different
limitation is prescribed by statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1977).

(Emphasis added.) This product

liability action is such a special case excluded from the general
statute of limitation by § 78-12-1.
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In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Product
Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seg. (1977).

Its

title describes the purposes of the Act as follows:

An act enacting

Sections

78+15-1 through

78-15-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953); relating
to product liability; creating a Utah Product
Liability Act; setting forth the purpose
and intent of the Act; establishing a statute
of_JJjftiitations for product liability cases
(1977 Utah Laws ch. 149).
The special "statute of limitations for product liability cases" is found at § 78-15-3(1), Utah\Code Annotated. (Repl.
Vol. 9A, 1977).

it provides, in pertinent part:

No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal jjnjury, death
or damage to property more thin six years
after the date of initial purchase for use
or consumption, or ten years after the date
of manufacture, of a product, where that
action is based upon, or arises out of, any
of the following:
(a)

Breach of any implied warranties;

Defects in design,
t (b)
testing or manufacture;
(c)

inspection,

Failure to warn;

(d) Failure to properly
the use of a product; or

instruct

in

(e) Any other alleged defect or failure
of whatsoever kind or nature in relation to
a product.
(Emphasis added) e
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Section 78-12-1 and the Product Liability Act, when
read in conjunction, unambiguously establish an exception to
the general two-year statute of limitations if claims arise from
the use of a defective product.
POINT II
ACCEPTED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
RENDER THE "TWO-YEAR11 STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION
Not only does the clear language of Title 78 compel a
finding that the limitation found at § 78-15-3(1), rather than
that set forth at § 78-12-28(2), applies to this action, but
accepted canons of statutory construction, when applied to this
case, require application of the Utah Product Liability Act's
statute of limitations.
A.

Where There is Doubt Regarding Which
of Two Arguably Applicable Statute of
Limitations to Apply in a Particular
Case, the Longer of the Two Periods
is Generally Preferred.
In Hardinge Company, Inc. v. Eimco Corporation, 1 Utah

2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494 (1954) , this Court was asked to decide whether the three-year limitation found at § 78-12-26(3) or the sixyear limitation found at § 78-12-23 was applicable. The plaintiff
could have stated a claim either for money paid under mistake,
or for breach of contract.

In addressing this question, the
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Court noted that "[t]he principal question on appeal . . . is
which limitation applies."

(266 P.2d at 495).

In resolving

this dispute, this Court held:
If a substantial doubt exists as to
which is the applicable statute of limitations, the longer rather than ' the shorter
period of limitations is to be preferred.
(266 P.2d at 496).
The basis for this canon of Statutory construction
was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Juab County Department
of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d ^9, 426 P.2d 1 (1967).
In Juab, the Court reiterated the above quoted language from
Hardinae, supra, and explained that "the law does not look with
favor upon the defeating of a just obligation if it can be properly avoided."

(426 P.2d at 3).

Courts in neighboring juris-

dictions have similarly adopted this ba$ic rule of statutory
construction.

See, e.g.. Orr v. Lewis Central School District.

298 N.W. 2d 256 (Iowa 1980); Drug, Cosmetib & Beauty Trades Service. Inc. v. McFate, 14 Ariz. App. 7, 480 p.2d 30 (1971); Matthews v. Travellers Indemnity Insurance Company. 245 Ark. 247,
432 S.W. 2d 485 (1968).
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B.

Should Two Statutes Relating to
the Same General Subject Matter
be in Conflict, the More Specific
of the Two Will Control,
In Millett v, Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934

(Utah 1980), The Utah Supreme Court considered the effect of an
apparent conflict between two statutory provisions relating to
statutes of limitation and adopted the following rule of construction in order to fulfill the legislatures intent:
. . . where the operation of two statutory provisions is in conflict, that provision
which is more specific in its application
will govern over that which is more general.
(609 P.2d at 936). This Court has uniformly applied the rule.
See, Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) ; Bateman v.
Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958) ; and Pacific Intermountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, 7
Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957).
The greater specificity of a given statute is compelling
when enacted after the adoption of the more general statute.
Bateman v. Board of Examiners, supra; Pacific Intermountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, supra.

Courts have uni-

formly held that where a later-enacted statute of limitations
provides a different limitation period for actions based on a
particular legal theory and, addresses the subject with greater
specificity, the more recent enactment must be regarded as an
exception to, or qualification of, the prior statute.
- 8 -

(E.g.,

Payne v. Far-Mar-Companv, 612 S.W.2d 54 (|lo. App. 1981) (limitation provision applicable to actions for breach of any contract
for sale constituted exception to prior statute imposing different
limitation on all actions based on written contracts); Nebraska
Mil-Nic. Inc. v. Hall County. 187 Neb. 656^ 193 N.W.2d 450 (1972)
(special statute of limitations controls over a general statute
because the special statute more properly expresses the legislative will).
The limitation provision invoke^ by defendants, which
was adopted in 1951, applies generally to actions "to recover
damages for the death of one caused by the Wrongful act or neglect
of another."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(2)1 (1977).

The statute

of limitations found in the Product Liability Act applied specifically to any action "for the recovery of damages for . . . death
. . . where that action is based upon, or arises out of, [b]reach
of any implied warranties," "[d]efects ifo design, inspection,
testing or manufacture," "[f]ailure to warn," "[f]ailure to properly instruct in the use of a product," on "OD^Y other alleged
defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in relation to a
product."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977).

This limitation

period, as the language of the Act indicates, applies only to a
specific class of actions which claims, although previously included within the general language of § 7$-12-28(2), have been
excluded from the latter's limitation by legislative action.

- 9 -

The limitation provision contained in the Utah Product Liability
Act, which expressly and specifically applies to actions seeking
damages for death caused by the use of defective products, must
be regarded as an exception to the prior general wrongful death
statute of limitations.
POINT III
A COURT CAN LOOK TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT TO
DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE
A Court can look to the legislature's intent to determine the applicability of a statute, Matheson v. Crockett, 577
P.2d 948 (Utah 1978) . The language of the Utah Product Liability
Act, when read in conjunction with § 78-12-1, unambiguously requires application of the six-year statute of limitations of
the Act to the plaintiff's action.

In the instant case, the

intent of the legislature, as set forth in § 78-15-2, is wholly
consistent with the language of the Act and with application of
the six-year limitation period in this action.

§ 78-15-2(3),

provides:
In enacting this Act, it is the purpose
of the legislature to provide a reasonable
time within which actions may be commenced
against manufacturers, while limiting the
time to a specific period for which product
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably
and accurately calculated; and to provide
other procedural changes to expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims.
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POINT IV
CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS'
POSITION THAT A STATUTE OF REPOSE
DOES NOT EXTEND THE LIMITATION OTHERWISE
PROVIDED BY A STATUTE OF LIMITATION
Defendants, in their cross-appeal, cite several cases
which purportedly stand for the propositlion that a statute of
repose does not extend the limitation otherwise provided by the
applicable statute of 1imitation•

Grisftom v. North American

Aviation, Inc. , 326 F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Flia. 1971); O'Connor v.
Altus. 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1975); Cadieux v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, 593 Fc2d 142 (1st
Cir. 1979) ; Comptroller of Virginia ex rfel. Virginia Military
Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 19*^7); Smith v. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporatiqn, 38 N.C. App. 457,
248 S.E.2d 462 (D.N.C. 1978) (overruled on other grounds). However, these cases may be distinguished fr^m that of the plaintiff's case, since the statutes under which they were decided
differ from the Utah Product Liability Ac*^.

Cadieux v. Inter-

national Telephone and Telegraph Corporatipn, 593 F.2d 142 (1st
Cir. 1979) , for example, involved interpretation of a Rhode Island
wrongful death statute with a two-year statute of limitation
that had been amended. The amendment retained the two-year limitation and provided a ten-year period after the sale of a product
as an additional limitation for commencemeilit of an action.
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The

Rhode Island legislature intended that the two limitation periods
should operate in conjunction with each other rather than separately as in the case at hand.
Another case, O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d
547 (N.J. 1975), involved statutes that apply to recovery of
damages in tort, contract or otherwise for bodily injury or wrongful death arising out of improvements to real property.

The

New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-1.1, specifically refers to
tort, contract or other types of action, thereby implying that
any other statutes which apply to these causes of action, including statutes of limitation, should be used in conjunction
with Section 2A: 14-1.1.

See also. Smith v. American Radiator

and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.
462 (D.N.C. 1978) (interpreting a South Carolina statute which
is identical in all material respects to the New Jersey statute) ;
Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465 (M.D.
Fla. 1971) (construing a Florida statute that provides a 12-year
limitation period within which actions might be brought against
architects or professional engineers); Comptroller of Virginia
ex rel. Virginia Military Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va.
1977) (construing a Virginia statute which sets outside limits
on tort or contract actions against architects for improper design) .

None of these cases involved product liability actions

brought under a separate product liability statute that set out
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its own period of limitation.

Thus, statues from other states

contrast with the Utah Product Liability Act which establishes
a limitation period for all actions based on breach of implied
warranties; defects in design, testing, inspection or manufacture;
failure to warn; failure to properly instruct in the use of a
product and any other defect or failure in ^ product. The limitations period in the Utah Act became a vested component upon plaintiff's filing of the action (see plaintiff's Brief on Appeal).
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct iili concluding that the
statute of limitations contained in the Ijtah Product Liability
Act was applicable to this action.

This court's declaration

that the statute was unconstitutional cannot act to deprive the
plaintiff his day in Court. To the extent &n action filed within
the then existing limitation period, the period becomes a vested
component of plaintiff's action which he cannot be constitutionally deprived of by a later declaration of unconstitutionality.
Therefore, plaintiff requests this Court reinstate the action
and direct the trial court to proceed with a| trial on the merits.
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